We compare the performance of unsecured personal installment loans made by traditional bank lenders with that of LendingClub, using a stochastic frontier estimation technique to decompose the observed nonperforming loans into three components. The first is the best-practice minimum ratio that a lender could achieve if it were fully efficient at credit-risk evaluation and loan management. The second is a ratio that reflects the difference between the observed ratio (adjusted for noise) and the minimum ratio that gauges the lender's relative proficiency at credit analysis and loan monitoring. The third is statistical noise. In 2013 and 2016, the largest bank lenders experienced the highest ratio of nonperformance, the highest inherent credit risk, and the highest lending efficiency, indicating that their high ratio of nonperformance is driven by inherent credit risk, rather than by lending inefficiency. LendingClub's performance was similar to small bank lenders as of 2013. As of 2016, LendingClub's performance resembled the largest bank lenders -the highest ratio of nonperforming loans, inherent credit risk, and lending efficiency -although its loan volume was smaller. Our findings are consistent with a previous study which suggest that LendingClub became more effective in risk identification and pricing starting in the 2015. Caveat: we note that this conclusion may not be applicable to fintech lenders in general, and the results may not hold under different economic conditions such as a downturn.
Introduction
Fintech lending has grown exponentially in recent years. LendingClub has become the largest lender in the U.S. for unsecured personal installment loans.
Previous research suggests that fintech lending has changed the financial landscape and expanded credit access to consumers. Some consumers have saved a significant amount by borrowing from LendingClub to pay off their credit card balance and boost their credit scores. Lemieux (2018 and show that, starting in 2015, the use of alternative data and complex algorithms have allowed fintech lenders to more accurately evaluate and price credit risk, thus being able to offer loans to more consumers at lower prices. 1 We attempt to explore LendingClub's lending efficiency compared with traditional lenders.
Using 2013 and 2016 data (before and after 2015), we compare the lending efficiency of LendingClub with U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), focusing on unsecured consumer loans, which exclude mortgages, automobile loans, home equity loans, and home equity lines of credit. 2 We define lending efficiency based on the percent of unsecured consumer loans that are nonperforming (i.e., the sum of past-due and charged-off consumer loans). 3 In 2013, average nonperforming loan ratios are 3.84 percent for loans held by BHCs compared with 2.17 percent at LendingClub. 4 In 2016, BHCs' nonperforming rate declined from 3.84 percent to 3.00 percent, while LendingClub's nonperforming rate almost doubled from 2.17 percent to 4.16 percent.
We ask whether LendingClub's higher rate of nonperformance in 2016 was a result of increased risk appetite (lending to riskier borrowers who default more often) or decreased proficiency in credit analysis and risk management? Similarly, we ask whether the lower rate of BHCs' nonperformance in 2016 was the result of taking less credit risk or getting better at loan monitoring and credit risk management.
To explore these questions, we estimate the best practice ratio of consumer loans that are nonperforming for each type of lender, based on Hughes and Moon (2017) . This is the minimum ratio of nonperforming consumer loans observed among all lenders in the sample, given their total volume of consumer loans to total loans, the average contractual interest rate they charge on their consumer loans (as a proxy of credit risk), and the economic conditions in their lending markets as measured by the average GDP growth rate and the local banking market concentration.
Best-Practice Ratio:
The best-practice ratio indicates the minimum ratio of nonperforming consumer loans to the total consumer loans a lender could achieve if it were fully efficient at credit risk evaluation and loan management. By using stochastic frontier analysis to estimate this conditional minimum, the influence of luck (statistical noise) can be eliminated. Thus, the difference between a BHC's achieved nonperforming loan ratio, adjusted for statistical noise, and the conditional minimum ratio (the best observed-practice ratio) would gauge a lender's relative proficiency at credit risk analysis and loan management.
Controlling for Size:
We divide BHC lenders into five size groups based on their consumer loan volume -largest banks (more than $10 billion), large banks ($1 billion to $10 billion), and three more groups of small banks (all less than $1 billion).
LendingClub's volume of unsecured consumer lending as of 2016 makes it comparable to large bank lenders. In terms of performance, LendingClub's rate of observed nonperformance -at 4.16 percent -is similar to the median nonperforming rate for both the largest banks and the large bank groups. However, having the same nonperforming loan ratio does not necessarily imply that they all are equally efficient.
We examine whether the similarity in the nonperforming loan ratios imply that the largest banks, large banks, and LendingClub all obtain similar exposures to credit risk. In addition, lenders exposed to the same amount of credit risk may not have the same nonperforming loan ratio because some lenders could be better at credit risk analysis and management. We find that LendingClub's nonperformance ratio is similar to the median best practice rates of nonperformance for the largest bank lendersand it is much higher than the median best practice nonperformance rate of the large bank lenders group (which is in the same size category as LendingClub). The higher best practice minimum nonperformance ratio means that the gap between the observed and the minimum ratio is smaller. Therefore, the largest bank lenders and LendingClub both exhibit higher lending efficiency than other bank lenders.
In 2013, LendingClub's rate of nonperformance ratio, which was very small at 2.17 percent, resembles the medians of smaller bank lenders (with less than $1 billion in unsecured consumer loans). Unlike in 2016, the best practice minimum nonperformance ratio was relatively low and similar across all size groups and for LendingClub. Thus, most of the observed nonperformance ratio in 2013 across all lender types seems to be caused by lending inefficiency rather than inherent credit Caveats: Since our fintech consumer lending data in this study come from a single fintech firm, our conclusions are based solely on LendingClub's loan performance and may not be applicable to the overall fintech lending segment of the financial sector. In addition, while the efficiency metric used in this study has been well accepted, conceptually sound, and widely used in academic literature, our analysis may be subject to some data limitations. There may be factors not observed in our data set or not taken into account by this measure that, if they could be observed and taken into account, might change the measured efficiencies. An important example of such an unobserved factor is that our focus on the recent loan performance does not include performance during an economic downturn. Different results might be observed under downturn conditions, especially if the economic downturn has different impacts on delinquency rates across bank and fintech lenders. Fintech lenders do not take deposits and their funding sources could dry up quickly, and fintech borrowers may be more affected during the downturn. Finally, our evaluation of lending efficiency does not account for other aspects of efficiency, such as the management of overall profit and funding cost.
The Data
The sample consists of top-tier U.S. BHCs and LendingClub at year-end 2013 and 2016. The data for the BHCs are obtained from the end-of-year Y9-C reports filed quarterly with regulators. A bank's local markets are identified from the FDIC Summary of Deposits data, which allow the calculation of a bank's local market conditions that influence the performance of its consumer loans -the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration and the 10-year average GDP growth rate. The calculation of a bank's average contractual interest rate on consumer loans relies on end-of-year Call Report data on the interest income received from consumer loans.
Bank subsidiaries' data collected from the Call Reports are summed across all subsidiaries under the same BHC to the level of the consolidated BHC. Only BHCs that file quarterly Y9-C reports are included in our sample. 5 The sample is then reduced to exclude those banks with a ratio of loans to assets of less than 0.10, those with unsecured consumer loans totaling less than $1 million, and those with a ratio of nonperforming consumer loans plus gross charge-offs to total consumer loans (plus charge-offs) that is unusually small likely due to errors (less than 0.001). The remaining 2016 sample consisting of 453 BHCs is then further reduced to 398 BHCs with bank subsidiaries that were required to submit quarterly Call Reports needed to compute the average contractual loan rate on consumer loans.
The remaining 2013 sample totals 872 BHCs, 755 of which have data needed to calculate the average contractual loan rate. LendingClub is not a bank, and it does not file a Call Report; however, its financial statements and additional data are publicly available on its website and on the SEC website. 6 For 2016 and 2013 data, Figure 1 These four figures compare each institution's observed ratio of nonperforming consumer loans (adjusted for statistical noise) with its best-practice minimum ratio.
The best-practice minimum ratio represents the ratio a lender could achieve if it were fully efficient at credit-risk evaluation and loan management. As such, the best-practice ratio represents the inherent credit risk of the institution's consumer loan portfolio.
And the difference between the observed ratio (adjusted for statistical noise) and the best-practice minimum ratio gauges an institution's lending inefficiency, since the 6 LendingClub loans are originated by WebBank, which sells loans back to LendingClub after three days. LendingClub then sells loans to the original investors who committed on the platform to funding them. When LendingClub operated purely as a peer-to-peer lender, it did not hold loans on its books. As it has started to securitize loans in recent years, it has been required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protect Act to hold 5 percent of these securitized loans. Payments and losses for all loans are reported at the loan level on the LendingClub website and in its SEC reports. Losses on the loans it sells are absorbed by the investors. 7 In reporting the volume of consumer loans, we do not include gross charge-offs.
influence of luck as well as local market conditions and the contractual interest rate have been taken into account in estimating the best-practice minimum ratio. Figures 1A and 2A point to these values for LendingClub.
Estimating the Best-Practice Nonperforming Ratio
The specification of the best-practice frontier in terms of environmental variables and characteristics of lenders defines an individual lender's peers for the purpose of comparing its performance with other lenders. Hughes and Mester (2015) explain the strategy for the inclusion of these characteristics and environmental variables in the estimating equation (p. 256): "These variables define the peer group that determines best-practice performance against which a particular bank's performance is judged. If something extraneous to the production process is included in the specification, this might lead to too narrow a peer group and an overstatement of a bank's level of efficiency. Moreover, the variables included determine which type of inefficiency gets penalized. If bank location, e.g., urban versus rural, is included in the frontier, then an urban bank's performance would be judged against other urban banks but not against rural banks, and a rural bank's performance would be judged against other rural banks. If it turned out that rural banks are more efficient than urban banks, all else equal, the inefficient choice of location would not be penalized."
To specify the equation used to estimate the best-practice minimum ratio of nonperforming consumer loans, we define a lender's peers by including variables that are associated with the scale of its lending and lending technology, variables that characterize economic conditions in the institution's local markets, and variables that are related to the credit risk of the borrowers its lending operations attract.
First, we define a lender's peers by the scale of its lending. We include the volume of consumer loans and the volume of all loans and the squared value of each of these volumes to allow for nonlinearity. These volumes control for scale-related effects such as lending technology and the potential for diversification.
Second, we define a lender's peers in terms of the macroeconomic conditions in its local lending markets, which are captured by the 10-year average GDP growth rate obtained for the states in which the lender maintains branches and, in the case of LendingClub, for the states in which it lends. The Summary of Deposits data for the commercial banks report the amount of deposits by each bank branch and the branch location. The state GDP growth rate is weighted by the proportion of a lender's deposits located in that state.
Third, we define a lender's peers in terms of the concentration of banks in its local markets. A lender operating in a concentrated local market is likely to obtain a better selection of credit applicants (in terms of credit risk) for any given contractual interest rate it charges for consumer loans. Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that, in the case of business loans, concentrated banking markets provide advantages both to the bank and to the borrower. While these advantages may not be relevant to consumer lending, we nevertheless control for market concentration in the states in which the lender operates. The state concentration index is weighted by the proportion of the lender's deposits that are located in each state. In the case of LendingClub, the state concentration index is weighted by the volume of LendingClub's loans made in that state as a proportion of LendingClub's total consumer loans.
We allow for the possibility that the relationship of the GDP growth rate and the concentration index to consumer loan performance can vary with a lender's volume of consumer lending. For example, the impact of the GDP growth rate on loan performance may differ for lenders with a large volume of consumer loans because their use of technologies associated with a large scale of lending may allow them to exploit growth more effectively. To account for this possibility, we interact the volume of consumer lending with the GDP growth rate and with the index of market concentration.
Fourth, we define a lender's peers in terms of the average contractual interest rate it charges on its consumer loans. We include the average contractual interest rate since this interest rate is related to the credit risk of the borrowers it attracts. The contractual interest rate includes a credit risk premium and, itself, influences the quality of loan applicants through adverse selection. 8 Moreover, a higher rate puts more financial pressure on a borrower and increases the probability of delinquency. 9 However, the selection of borrowers by credit quality that a lender attracts at any particular contractual interest rate depends on a variety of factors in addition to the interest rate. Lenders may also offer loan applicants superior quality services that result in a better selection of loan applicants (in terms of credit risk) for any particular contractual interest rate charged. Examples of superior quality services include speed and convenience (e.g., a geographically convenient local bank with a relationship to the borrower, a lender offering a fast and easy application process, and a lender making speedy credit decisions). Trust is another factor that may give a local bank or a customer's incumbent bank an advantage in lending to some customers. To the extent that trust and convenience give lenders a better selection of credit applicants for any particular contractual interest rate, these factors will tend to reduce the expected rate of nonperformance at any given contractual interest rate and enhance the measured lending efficiency of convenient and trusted lenders. Generally, we cannot directly measure convenience and trust. Even if they could be measured, it would not be appropriate to control for them in the specification of the frontier since doing so would too narrowly define peers so as to eliminate, for example, a convenient and speedy application process as a source of efficiency. 10 We obtain the contractual rate from Call Report data by dividing the interest income received from consumer loans by the volume of consumer loans. To allow for the possibility that the association of the average contractual interest rate with loan performance differs by the size of the lender, we interact the rate with the volume of consumer lending. To allow for the possibility that the average contractual rate's association with loan performance differs by market concentration, we interact the average contractual rate with the index of market concentration.
The specific specification of the equation to be estimated is given by
where NP i = ratio of nonperforming consumer loans to total consumer loans at bank i, X is a vector consisting of loan volumes and control variables, 
by the sum of a two-sided, normally distributed error term,
captures statistical noise, and a term,
that measures the systematic excess nonperforming loan ratio. 11 The deterministic kernel of the frontier defines the minimum (best practice) ratio:
11 We considered the normal distribution for the one-sided error term and conducted Vuong's (1989) test to select the better between the normal/half-normal model and the normal/exponential model. We also tested whether a constant term is needed. For both 2013 and 2016, we found that, with statistical significance, the normal/exponential model is better than the normal/half-normal model. For 2013, with statistical significance the normal/exponential model with a constant term is better than the normal/exponential model without a constant term. For 2016, the normal/exponential model with a constant term is better than the normal/exponential model without a constant term, which is, however, statistically insignificant.
The best-practice ratio gauges the nonperforming consumer loan ratio a bank would achieve if it were totally efficient at credit evaluation and loan management -its inherent credit risk.
We adopt the technique of Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt (1982) and define the bank-specific excess nonperforming loan ratio by the expectation of  i conditional on  i :
and statistical noise (luck) by the expectation of  i conditional on  i :
Subtracting noise from the observed nonperforming loan ratio yields the noiseadjusted observed nonperforming loan ratio:
Thus, the estimation of equation (1) yields a decomposition of the observed nonperforming loan ratio into a minimum nonperforming loan ratio that reflects inherent credit risk, the excess ratio that reflects inefficiency at evaluating credit risk and managing loans, and statistical noise:
Figures 1A and 2A highlight the distance between the noise-adjusted nonperforming loan ratio and the best-practice ratio for LendingClub. Rearranging equation (6) expresses this distance for any particular observation as the excess nonperforming loan ratio or inefficiency:
The estimated equation (1) is described in Table 1 for 2016 and in Table 1A for 2013.
Evidence of Inherent Credit Risk and Lending Inefficiency
Figures 1 and 2 plot the ratio of nonperforming consumer loans to total consumer loans against the log transformation of total consumer loans (in thousands)
for 2016 and 2013, respectively. Figure 1A and 2A narrow the range of values of the volume of consumer loans to magnify the individual points. Table 2 reports that the average noise-adjusted, observed ratio of nonperforming consumer loans for all lenders is 0.0300 in 2016, and Table 2A reports The median excess nonperforming ratio, when broken down by the consumer lending size groups, shows the pattern evident in the four plots. Specifically, the median excess nonperforming loan ratio ranges from the smallest size group to the largest size groups in 2016 is as follows: 0.0165 for the smallest bank lenders (less than $10 million); 0.0200 for bank lenders from $10 million to $100 million; 0.0212 for bank lenders from $100 million to $1 billion; and 0.0389 for large banks ($1 billion to $10 billion); and 0.0009 for the largest banks (more than $10 billion). The ratio rises as bank size gets larger but then declines dramatically as bank size increases to more than $10 billion.
As mentioned previously, for bank lenders in the range of $1 billion to $10 billion, the median excess nonperforming loan ratio increases to 0.0389; however, this excess ratio at LendingClub is only 0.0008, a much smaller ratio at LendingClub than that of its size group peers ($1 billion to $10 billion). Interestingly, the median excess ratio of the largest lenders (consumer lending that exceeds $10 billion) is only 0.0009, which is the smallest median inefficiency of all the five size group of banks -even smaller than that of the smallest size group. LendingClub's excess ratio is 0.0008, which is even smaller (but very close to) than that of the largest bank lenders. In summary, the largest bank lenders and LendingClub appear to be more proficient at consumer lending than banks in smaller size groups.
Notably, these largest lenders also assume the highest inherent credit risk measured by the median of 0.0428. The small difference, 0.0009, between the noiseadjusted observed ratio, 0.0496, and the best-practice ratio, 0.0428, provides evidence of the lending proficiency of the largest bank lenders. LendingClub resembles these largest lenders in their high rate of observed nonperformance, 0.0416, and their high best-practice rate, 0.0408, whose difference, 0.0008, reflects efficient lending. The chart in Figure 1A , which identifies the lenders in the plot, shows that LendingClub and many of the largest bank lenders exhibit similar inherent credit risk and lending efficiency. A number of papers, notably Lemieux (2018 and 
Conclusions
We apply the techniques developed by Hughes and Moon (2017) and used in Hughes, Jagtiani, Mester, and Moon (2018) to compare the performance of consumer 12 In 2013, the mean noise-adjusted, observed ratio of nonperforming consumer loans for all lenders is 0.0384, and the median is 0.0261. The plots in Figures 2 and 2A show that most of the largest lenders experience a nonperforming consumer loan ratio, which is very close to its bestpractice ratio. Groups of smaller lenders with consumer loans totaling less than $1 billion exhibit similar median noise-adjusted and best-practice ratios. As shown in Table 4A , Panel B, their median noise-adjusted nonperforming loan ratios fall in the narrow range of 0.0244 to 0.0286. However, larger lenders with consumer loans totaling between $1 billion and $10 billion experience a much higher median noise-adjusted ratio, 0.0532, and a median bestpractice ratio, 0.0037, which is larger than that of smaller banks. Their median excess nonperforming loan ratio, 0.0494, is the highest of the five size groups. The volume of LendingClub's consumer loans places it among the lenders in this group; however, its excess nonperforming loan ratio is much lower, 0.0155 --the difference between an observed, noiseadjusted ratio of 0.0216 and a best-practice ratio of 0.0061. The largest lenders with consumer loans in excess of $10 billion exhibit a median excess ratio, 0.0039. These very large lenders take on high inherent credit risk, a median best-practice ratio of 0.0479, and experience a median observed, noise-adjusted ratio, 0.0639. Measured by the median values, the largest bank lenders experience the highest observed rate of nonperformance, the highest best-practice rate, and the lowest rate in excess of best-practice, the lowest lending inefficiency. The credit risk assumed by most of the largest bank lenders is much greater than LendingClub, while their lending proficiency is generally better. The list of lenders corresponding to the plot in Figure 2A shows that five of the six largest bank lenders obtain a very small degree of lending inefficiency. The best-practice minimum gauges the inherent credit risk of each lender's consumer loans. The difference between an observed ratio of nonperforming consumer loans, adjusted for statistical noise, and the best observed practice minimum gauges the relative proficiency of the institution at assessing credit risk and monitoring loans.
We find the largest bank lenders experience the highest median rate of nonperforming unsecured consumer loans and that this high nonperforming loan rate seems to be associated with risker loans rather than inefficiency in lending. The largest banks have the smallest inefficiency, as measured by the smallest difference between the (noise-adjusted) observed ratio and the best-practice (minimum) ratio. These largest bank lenders are, on average, the most efficient at consumer lending even though they experience the highest observed rate of nonperformance.
LendingClub's unsecured consumer lending places it in the second-largest group of consumer lenders ($1 billion to $10 billion). However, our analysis suggests that there are notable differences between these traditional lenders and LendingClub in 2016 (but not in 2013). In 2016, the median ratio of (noise-adjusted) observed nonperforming loans is similar between LendingClub and these traditional banks (in the second-largest group), but the difference between the (noise-adjusted) observed nonperformance ratio and the best-practice ratio is higher for these bank lenders than for LendingClub, indicating that LendingClub is more efficient than these large banks.
LendingClub's small degree of inefficiency more closely resembles that of the largest bank lenders.
Our results suggest that, as of 2016, LendingClub's unsecured consumer lending exhibited inherent credit risk and lending efficiency that resembled the risk and efficiency of the largest traditional bank lenders; that is, higher credit risk-taking and greater lending efficiency. These results were not found as of 2013. Our findings are consistent with Jagtiani and Lemieux (2019) , which suggest that the observed greater lending efficiency may be related to a greater capacity to accurately evaluate credit risk using more advanced technology, more complex algorithms, and alternative data sources (starting in 2015). Such advanced technology might be less accessible for smaller traditional lenders. 13 We note that the higher inherent credit risk-taking at the largest bank lenders and at LendingClub does not necessarily imply inappropriate risk-taking. Hughes and Moon (2017) find evidence that, while greater lending inefficiency tends to erode market value at all banks, taking more inherent credit risk enhances market value at the largest banks. They conclude that additional credit risk-taking at the largest bank lenders may be motivated by market discipline through the lenders' incentive to maximize their market value. Figure 1A
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